PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS
-LESSON LEARNED FROM COVID19
Dr.
P.C.Ranka,(M.D.Medicine)
The purpose of this article is to
enlighten decision makers about this “new reality of pandemic.” This detailed
discussion of preparedness will be followed with potential resources for
healthcare leaders to ensure appropriate preparation and response. This article’s
objectives are to facilitate the reader’s (1) understanding of pandemic, (2)
appreciation
for how it got spread globally, (3)
recognition and acknowledgement of India’s
vulnerabilities, and (4) ability to transition our organisation into being
prepared to react to, and care for, patients exposed to covid 19.
Steps to pandemic Preparedness Learned late
still useful for future:
The following are four
basic preparation steps that may be implemented by
healthcare managers and
facilities to prepare for pandemic
These four steps are:
1. Prepare for public
health issues. This step is directed toward public health authorities and their
preparedness actions
2. Prepare for healthcare
delivery issues. step
is inherent to healthcare
managers and clinicians
3. Prepare for support
issues. step of support issues handled by both the public health and private
healthcare sectors
4. Prepare for security and
hazard issues. This step is directed toward security and policing and general
administration department.
They should be specifically
ordered in this manner that they would become relevant to healthcare facility
managers.
Step one:
The specific tasks for
medical surveillance i.e.
Identify departments
responsible for medical surveillance and reporting.
Develop a surveillance plan
for detecting unusual medical events.
Establish medical baselines
diagnosis. The public health sector, if efficient, must provide an effective medical diagnosis of infection and
define
possible pandemic strain at
the earliest possible.
The the second challenge to
public health officials, is to
Identify the department
responsible for contacting and coordinating sample submission and confirm
clinical diagnosis by laboratory results,
policies and procedures in
consultation with the central government, ICMR, virology labs together with
major stakeholders.
Identify the process by
which the public health department will provide support to the pandemic
investigation team at state and central level.
Early detection of the
related organism/strain is vital to an
efficient and effective healthcare preparation and response plan.
Physicians suspecting the disease
should notify public health authorities and ask for aid in defining the
suspected problem. reporting must take
place in a public health infrastructure, which is virtually non-existent in
many districts, and very weak at the state level. To investigate, we need much
more PCR laboratories to identify what the virus strain is, but such facilities
exist in very few laboratories although we have such PCR facilities at in
Agriculture and botany departments of academic universities. They were not
utilised in the present pandemic.
Another challenge to public
health preparedness, is
Identify departmental
responsibility for epidemiological investigation.
Determine the method of
reporting.
Identify processes and
procedures for reporting suspicious disease patterns or health problem to law
enforcement officials.
The epidemiological
investigation should take the medical surveillance and medical diagnosis measures
one step further in terms of reporting and aiding investigation.
The epidemiological investigation
should be used to determine when and where the disease was initiated and with whom the patient has
come in contact prior to their arrival at the healthcare facility. It was
largely missing in present pandemic
one important challenge in
public health preparation is to prepare a plan for the mass prophylaxis of a
community and its surrounding areas
The process of mass prophylaxis includes agent
identification, delivery and training of protective equipment, dissemination
plans for prophylaxis of the community, and, again, establishing lines of
communication that will facilitate these actions.
We need to Devise a plan to access medicines
and health care delivery institutions and to Equipment.
° Acquire needed equipment
to implement pandemic disaster plan (i.e., masks, gowns, filters, biohazard
waste disposal systems ventilators, high flow oxygen facilities, day care
facilities).
° Train personnel on
equipment use.
Determine departmental
responsibility and plan for supply and dissemination of prophylaxis
measures extensive IEC plan should be
implemented earliest possible.
Develop policies and procedures for sharing
information among the local administration team, the public health department,
and those responsible for mass prophylaxis.
Identify points of contact for each area of
support and establish lines of communication.
The last challenge for the
public health system is for community leaders to address the structure of
coordinating preparation efforts in their community in terms of both the
infrastructure and communication networks and to avoid delicacy of efforts as several
different agencies are responsible for various coordination challenge is the
development of intra-agency communication methods to unite:
Local public health
agencies
Local institutional health
care providers
Local health professional
providers
Agencies like ICMR
Diagnostic services providers, State, District and local administration.
The critical ability for networking to occur among these agencies
can increase or decrease the level of response taken by a healthcare
organization. Thus, preparedness and communication among the local, state, and central
public health representatives is essential in pandemic event.
Step Two: Preparing for Healthcare Delivery Issues
Step two consists of two key preparation challenges separate from
those of the public health
systems:
1. Care of presented casualties and the worried well
2. Emergency management operations
Care of presented casualties and the worried well is defined as
the actual steps and procedures necessary for healthcare facilities to prepare
emergency medical systems that are fully integrated with aspects of pandemic and
patient symptom assessment questionnaires specifically addressing the virus in
question.
The “worried well” aspect of this step implies that when a
publicized pandemic event occurs many patients, anxious about symptoms of the
publicized agent, will flock to and overwhelm acute care facilities even when
they have not been credibly exposed. How a healthcare facility handles,
separates, and treats the presented casualties and “worried well” patients can
strengthen or prohibit the spread of hysteria and true symptomatic
identification.
Along with the problem of hysteria among the uninfected is the
issue of how a healthcare facility will handle the surge of truly afflicted
patients into their facility
At the present time hospitals are running very near to capacity.
They
are financially strapped and short of personnel. Many of the
hospitals
in major metropolitan health settings could not accommodate a
sudden surge of 50 acutely ill new patients. Thus, issues of personnel and finance must be
addressed in terms of the “worried well” and the
possibility of a surge of
patients, both infected and uninfected, to healthcare facilities across the nation
in the event of pandemic. The challenges in providing health care for presented
casualties and the worried well are:
● Creating a modular
emergency medical system (MEMS) or similar plan
● Coordinating MEMS with all
hospital emergency preparedness plans (EPPs)
● Preparing plans for legal
issues such as liability of providers and worker’s compensation
● Formulating plans to
integrate mutual aid and state and central assistance
● Developing a detailed
questionnaire for rapidly collecting patient’s identification and background
information (such as where
the patients were in the previous few days, etc.)
● Performing exercises of
MEMS and/or EPPs
The Citizens are likely to
believe they will receive the best care possible by EMS and thus, the public
believes that hospitals “have an inherent obligation to the community for pandemic
preparedness. The question is, will hospitals actually be getting it done? Or will
hospitals provide incomplete, misleading information to the public in order to
ease public
opinion?
Coupled with addressing
presented casualties and worried well patients is the preparation of an
actionable emergency management plan and definition of continuing operations.
The most vital piece of this plan is the recognition and report of key signs to
the emergency operations
center (EOC). The specific
emergency management operations tasks to achieve this second challenge of
healthcare delivery are:
● Review local plans that
call for activation of an EOC and make sure an “unusual medical event” triggers
activation.
● Identify key stakeholders
Possible key signs and
symptoms should be outlined in the written plan to notify the proper personnel
in healthcare facilities that an “unusual medical event” may be occurring. If
these are not built into a facility’s EOC, the preparation technique of an EOC
could be useless; if unusual signs and symptoms are not reported early,
continuing infection may occur. As in the previous steps mentioned, proactive
communication with personnel is vital to an efficient and useful EOC.
Step Three: Preparing
for Support Issues
Step three consists of four
support issues for which the healthcare facility and its community
must be prepared:
1. Fatality management
2. Resource and logistic
support
3. Continuity of
infrastructure
4. Family support services
Fatality management, the first challenge of
support issues, comprises the creation of a fatality management plan and
includes tasks such as:
● Creating a fatality
management plan that deals with the potential for overwhelmed city morgues and
the religious concerns of relatives
● Establishing safe handling procedures
This plan is different from
the EOC in that it must include how the facility and/or community will deal
with overwhelming surges at city morgues, funeral homes, and family counselling
services. Another aspect to be considered, based on the mission of the
healthcare facility, is religious counselling and religious services provided
for the dying and their families. While caring for the fatally sick, healthcare
facilities must develop plans for positive identification of the dead, as well
as handling and tracking procedures as the deceased are moved from facility to
facility.
The resource and logistic
support aspect of this step includes the development of plans to organize and
statistically quantify the resources used and on which patients they are used.
This second support issue includes these tasks:
Creating and assigning
responsibility for a resource support plan
Creating and assigning responsibility
for a logistic support plan
Resource and logistic plans
should include recommendations for supply continuation in case a facility’s
primary supply source is terminated or difficult to use during the pandemic.
Due to the current
financial crisis of the health care system, hospitals that use “just-in-time”
inventory, for example, will have minimum on-site storage of sterile supplies,
vital equipment, and pharmaceuticals. “Re supply” and “back-up” mechanisms are often
shared by all local and regional medical institutions and health department:
Thus, there is a fear among
healthcare personnel and physicians that the tracking of resources may not be
efficient enough to enable facilities to access needed resources and/or
that resources will be easily
depleted in particular communities. Devising resource and logistic communication
networks prior to a pandemic event is vital in ensuring that healthcare facilities
have the ability to respond with necessary equipment effectively will aid in
lessening this inevitable confusion and
enhance a healthcare facility’s
ability to respond.
Continuity of
infrastructure refers to plans made to continue providing services(health care,
water, sewage, electricity, foodstuffs, etc.) once a pandemic event has occurred.
To help ensure the
continuity of infrastructure, the third challenge of support issues, it is
important to assign responsibility for completion of a local infrastructure
plan.
“Few hospitals now have
comfortable operating margins” due to the restrictions of government support,
several expensive or underfunded regulatory mandates, high expectations that
hospitals maintain increasing levels of charity medical care, and the national
shortage of nurses and personnel, and many are without the provisions for
extraordinary surge capacity. Accordingly, it is unlikely that hospitals can
meet surges of capacity during a mass casualty event and expect to immediately
continue their normal care after the surge capacity of patients has been
treated. Although many of the primary services in this plan must be operated by
the local district health authorities, it is vital that hospitals, emergency
clinics, and private clinics prepare plans on how they will provide
professionally trained personnel administering to the community during a time
of pandemic crisis.
Family support services
must be involved with the previously mentioned plans. The key task in
supporting family services is ensuring that hospital emergency preparedness
plans reference local emergency response plans for family support services.
Not only should
healthcare-related facilities be prepared to continue their services, but they
also may wish to plan for additional family support services such as religious
services, counselling, social services, financial services, and guidance to
find missing loved ones
Step Four: Preparing
for Security and Hazard Issues
Least likely to be handled
by an individual healthcare facility, but still pertinent to the preparation for
pandemic, are the challenges regarding security and hazard issues. Tasks to be accomplished
by authorized personnel in the community are:
1. Control of affected
area/population
2. Residual hazard
assessment and mitigation
Controlling the affected
area/population is a security issue that is primarily the responsibility of the
local and state police departments during the event of pandemic attack. Police departments
must have physical plans for the affected buildings, streets, and
transportation systems, and so on. Police departments should also set up proper
communication channels enabling the local public health department, police
departments, and EMS respondents to communicate with one another. The key tasks
in controlling the affected area and population, the first challenge of
security and hazard issues, include:
The local police department
should establish physical security plans that address the potential areas
affected by pandemic event.
Consider establishing and
promulgating a policy that only public affairs officials talk to the press.
Establish points of contact
for a local public affairs office with the police.
The creation of policies
indicating that only public affairs officials should talk to the press is
extremely critical to maintaining the credibility of healthcare facilities. This
will also limit the communication of inaccurate information, control hysteria
among the population, and control
the response of the
“worried well” and community individuals worried about their loved ones.
Develop protocols for such situations
to facilitate response to a pandemic.
Conclusion
Regarding Preparedness
The readers of this article
are likely to be managers of healthcare organizations that will encounter
pandemic in the future. For such organizations, there are three related issues:
Pandemic preparedness, response, and change in response to a direct attack or
based on experience from other countries or states.
. Although no one can
foretell the specifics of such pandemics, the healthcare systems must have
response plans in place for any number
of events because each type
of pandemics has a set of
characteristics and dangers
and needs specialized equipment and very specialized treatment means and
procedures. Pandemics preparedness should be bioagent-specific and involve
significant levels of planning.
The preparation by a
healthcare facility for a pandemic is by no means simple or inexpensive.
Outlined and practiced
procedures, instructional manuals, the development of communication networks,
and the training of personnel on bioagents are
absolutely vital to any
facility, healthcare or not, to be ready for a potential attack.
This article serves only as an introduction to
how intricate and, at times, extremely difficult preparing for an event of such
magnitude can be for the administrators of a healthcare facility.
Extensive training and
retraining are needed so that the plans are not sitting on healthcare leaders
and professionals must participate
in realistic exercises to
practice skills developed in training and to identify areas that need
improvement. All too often the healthcare members who believe they are prepared
come to discover gross inadequacies during simulation exercises. Until practice
and drill exercises can be performed to perfect emergency reaction plans, it is
probably safe to say that healthcare facilities are unprepared and there is
reason to have serious concern about their preparedness.
Epilogue
According to the
assessment, virtually all the states reported a “poor” performance in
the following categories:
● Health outcome monitoring
● Emergency
telecommunications service
● Resources to reduce
barriers to health services
● Assessed ability to
increase health care five to ten fold
● Assessed pharmaceutical
inventories
● Medical triage procedures
● Emergency protective
equipment in hospitals
● Assessed emergency response
of public health workforce
● Education of healthcare
providers/lab workers
● Training on decontamination
procedures
● Public health workforce cross-trained
with emergency response system
● Training on
emotional/mental health aspects
● Dissemination of research
information by local public health system
It is clearly showed that
public health, healthcare facilities, police departments, and local and state
governments are not ready for pandemic. With the dissemination of information,
incomplete communication structures, and inefficient emergency operation plans,
the central govt. is also not prepared. demonstrates that we have a long road
to travel yet.
Because an emergency
preparedness plan can never plan for all possibilities of mass casualty, responding
to pandemic is extremely difficult to plan for in its entirety. The current financial
crisis of the Indian healthcare system directly affects preparedness and
response for mass
casualty incidents in
several ways. It is argued that the lack of proper funding to hospitals and
response facilities causes an inadequate response to lack of equipment,
personnel, and training; even if a preparation plan is devised by the facility,
a plan cannot be implemented if the financial institutions do not exist to
implement the plan. The lack of financial infrastructure in current healthcare
facilities is only one hindrance to an adequate response to pandemic
Therefore, should the Indian
population still worry about adequate preparedness? Most definitely, but it
should not stop there. The public should help prepare local organizations, but
also should work with others in the
community. Everyone needs to be ready to “defend in depth”
patients, co -workers, and loved ones.
The truth of the new reality of pandemic is not that it can kill, but that it
has the potential to kill alarming numbers of people.
To
keep up to date knowledge of the
changing pandemic context, a variety of sources should be monitored—not only
the news, WhatsApp or social media, but also specific Web sites like that of
WHO. ICMR, CDC etc. These sites will enable the reader to access a wide range
of insights into pandemic, disease management as those realities continue to
change.
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